By Jaron C. Collis, Lyndon C. Lee (auth.), Pablo Noriega, Carles Sierra (eds.)
Electronic trade, as a gamut of actions regarding digital transactions played over a community through software program that could be kind of self sufficient, is an rising truth. Strategic stories have proven that digital trade is an enormous progress undefined.
The publication is dedicated to the demanding situations and possibilities that digital trade opens for agent know-how. For your time, digital trade has attracted the avid cognizance of agent-builders and agent expertise researchers, and those have decisively contributed to advancing the cutting-edge within the box. The second-generation software program brokers now getting into the scene carry nice promise for the additional development of digital trade. This e-book originates from a workshop on Agent-Mediated digital buying and selling held at Agents'98 in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in may perhaps 1998. The 11 rigorously reviewed and revised papers current a special survey of software program brokers within the context of digital commerce.
Read Online or Download Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce: First International Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Trading AMET-98 Minneapolis, MN, USA, May 10th, 1998 Selected Papers PDF
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Extra info for Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce: First International Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Trading AMET-98 Minneapolis, MN, USA, May 10th, 1998 Selected Papers
Furthermore, when we consider the trust properties of auctions, we see that the descending second price auction is susceptible to manipulation by an untrusted auctioneer in the same way as the Vickrey auction, while the ﬁrst price ascending auction is untrusted-auctioneer compatible because the winning agent pays the price that it bid (UAC , Table 2). Both progressive auctions are however susceptible to indirect price manipulation (IC S , Table 2). It is interesting to note that it is impossible for an auction mechanism to be both buyer and seller incentive compatible (compare Table 1 and Table 2) , and that we must accept indirect price manipulation in return for simple optimal bidding strategies.
The auction terminates after a period of inactivity. In descending price auctions the auctioneer lowers the ask price until the ﬁrst bid is received, when the auction is immediately terminated. In a sealed bid auction all bids are private, and the auctioneer selects the winning bid after a ﬁxed period of time. In all simple auction mechanisms the good is sold to the bidding agent with the highest bid. In ﬁrst price auctions an agent pays the price of its bid, while in second price auctions an agent pays the highest amount that was bid by another agent [6,9].
We conclude that the most suitable auction for agent mediated on-line auctions, when the space of possible goods is large and diverse, and users do not know their reservation prices for all goods, is the ﬁrst price ascending auction. In on-line auctions it is worth having agents submit many bids if this enables some users to avoid computing accurate valuations in order to participate. Prices in progressive auctions provide feedback that allow users to avoid and delay the cognitive cost of determining an accurate value for a good.